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This paper analyses the interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy using the original Barro and Gordon (1983) model extended
to include fiscal policy, dynamics and the level of institutional qual-
ity, measured as bureaucratic corruption. It is found that delegating
monetary policy to an independent central bank (i.e. not fiscally domi-
nated) the second best solution of the model is achievable only if there
is no bureaucratic corruption. Otherwise, when institutional quality is
not optimal, unless a less conservative than the government, regarding
output considerations, independent central bank is delegated, the sec-
ond best is not restored. The government has the incentive to increase
debt strategically in an attempt to increase second period inflation.
This result is augmented by the quality of institutions and poses diffi-
culties on the achievement of both price stability and a balanced debt
process. Quality of institutions, hence, can provide an explanation for
the poorer inflation performance, due to debt boosts, of countries with
lower institutional quality despite the introduction of central bank in-
dependence.
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Introduction
Following the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) inflation has been explained as the result of lack of com-
mitment from the monetary authority’s side in a game where the monetary
authority interacts with the private sector. The source of the excessive infla-
tion in the absence of a commitment technology is due to the policymaker’s
incentive to stimulate activity through unanticipated inflation. However,
as the private sector correctly foresee future policy incentives, at the equi-
librium, any attempt to boost output (employment) is pointless and the
economy ends up with an inflation bias. Consequently, the source of the
inflation bias reduces to what drives the time-inconsistent behaviour of the
policymaker.
The underlying feature for this problem is that the output goals of the
private sector and the policymaker differ. The monetary authority considers
the market-determined level of output without policy intervention to be
‘too low’ from a social perspective. Thus, since nominal contracts are set
before the monetary policy is selected, the policymaker faces the incentive
of generating unexpected monetary shocks and deviating ex post in order
to stimulate output (and employment) and bring it closer to the socially
optimum level.
The fact that the market-determined level of output is considered too
low has been motivated in two major ways. A branch of the literature (for
example Rogoff (1985), Canzoneri (1985)) assumes that imperfections in the
labour market, due to unions’ monopolistic power, keep the real wage too
high at the expense of output. This explanation can also provide justifica-
tion for the difference between the objective function1 of the private sector
(that is defined as the wage setters and thus the ‘insiders’) and the one of
the policymaker (which includes both the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’, and
thus corresponds to the social utility function). The second motivation for
the output goal conflict among the private sector and the policymaker, ini-
tiated by Barro and Gordon (1983), is the existence of tax distortions that
reduce the level of activity below its market clearing level. Moreover, dis-
tortions could also be derived from imperfections in the goods market (e.g.
monopolistic competition).
Nonetheless, whatever the motivation for the output goal difference, as
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) correctly point out, everything boils down to
taxation. That is to say, if non-distortionary (i.e. lump-sum) taxes existed,
then even if some market imperfections were driving output below the so-
cially optimum level, the policymaker could correct this ‘output gap’ by
subsidising firms and obtain the socially desired outcome without excessive
1From now on we will be referring to the objective function of the players as the utility
function, which more precisely corresponds to the loss function with a negative sign.
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inflation.
Therefore, it is the nonexistence of non-distortionary taxation that cre-
ates the time-inconsistency problem. The inflation bias is partially deter-
mined by the taxation policy and hence depends on the financing structure
of government spending. In other words, the time-inconsistency of monetary
policy is solidly linked with fiscal policymaking, and hence the distortionary
nature of fiscal policy should not be considered exogenous.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) introduce a third player, the fiscal authority
(government), in the original static Barro and Gordon (1983) model and in
this way taxes, and hence distortions and the monetary policy inflation bias,
are endogenised. Interaction among the two ‘big’ players (the fiscal and the
monetary authority) becomes a crucial determinant for every outcome. With
the consideration of public goods provision in the social welfare function, and
the introduction of the government budget constraint, inflation also serves
as a tool for government revenues (seigniorage) and the discrepancy between
the output goals of the private sector and the policymakers, and hence the
incentive to use surprise inflation, is no longer regime invariant.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) conclude that, in the absence of any com-
mitment mechanism, starting from the case where both monetary and fiscal
decisions are set by a centralised authority and reducing the relative weights
on output and government spending for the monetary authority (i.e. delegat-
ing monetary policy to a Rogoff-type conservative central bank) improves
upon the discretionary outcome, in line with Rogoff’s (1985) result when
fiscal policy is exogenous.
Recently, Huang and Wei (2005) incorporate quality of institutions in
the static model of Alesina and Tabellini (1987). Quality of institutions
is modelled as bureaucratic corruption, in the sense that the tax collection
mechanism exhibits inefficiencies. This new element has crucial implications
for the model, as it limits fiscal authority’s formal tax channel of government
revenues and hence increases the importance and reliance on inflation tax
for the required government revenues to be raised.
Moreover, there is a series of papers2 that examine the dynamics of
the model by allowing for the government to issue public debt, abstract-
ing, however, from corruption issues. With endogenous fiscal policy and
dynamic considerations, tax, distortions and inflation biases are no longer
time invariant. Debt policy affects the need for tax revenues and seigniorage.
This work attempts to bring together the above mentioned papers and
readdress the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, focusing es-
pecially on the driving forces of monetary and fiscal policy making under
different levels of institutional quality. We establish that the second best
outcome of the model (given by a centralised authority that is able to pre-
2For example Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), Jensen
(1994).
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commit) is a function of the quality of institutions. Lower quality results
in higher optimal inflation levels, lower tax levels3, government spending,
output gap, as well as lower social welfare. In other words, the best an
economy facing corruption issues can do, in a second best world, is worse
compared to an economy with high quality of institutions.
Developing countries have traditionally higher seigniorage revenues and
lower quality of institutions, compared to advanced economies. Thus, it is
interesting to see how optimal monetary and fiscal policy can be achieved
or what kind of institutional arrangements can improve upon the outcomes
where a commitment technology is not available. More precisely, this paper
focuses on the implications of central bank independence.
We find that without corruption limitations, an independent central bank
(i.e. a central bank that is not fiscally dominated) can achieve the second
best without the need for increased inflation aversion relative to output.
However, with the introduction of tax inefficiencies, this result no longer
holds. Unless a less conservative, regarding output considerations, indepen-
dent central bank is delegated, the government will use debt strategically
to affect monetary policy setting. More precisely, the government has the
incentive to increase first period debt in an attempt to increase second pe-
riod inflation. As a result of that, economies with low institutional quality
that set independent central banks, losing seigniorage revenue, should ob-
serve rising levels of debt and higher levels of inflation vis a` vis their more
developed counterparts.
Hence we conclude that even if fiscal dominance phenomena are appro-
priately tackled, through central bank independence, fighting corruption is
vital for sustainable disinflation, correction of intertemporal distortions and
improved social welfare levels. With the introduction of central bank in-
dependence, concentrating on the quality of institutions could avoid debt
boosts and consequently could enhance price stability.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the
model and the solution in a first best world. Section 2 determines the second
best outcome, which corresponds to a centralised economy that is able to
commit and it also refers to the case where the centralised authority is be-
having discretionary. Section 3, following Rogoff’s argument, presents the
case where monetary policy is delegated to a weight-conservative central
bank. After analysing a few special cases (Section 4) that provide the nec-
essary background, in Section 5 we analyse the implications of constituting
central bank independence in a dynamic environment under different levels
of institutional quality. Section 6 concludes.
3Taxes are negatively related to quality of institutions, given that the structural pa-
rameters of the model satisfy a condition. The same applies to output gap.
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1 The Model
There are three players in the economy that live for two periods; the private
sector that sets inflation expectations, the government that is responsible
for the fiscal policy and sets taxes, government spending and debt, and the
central bank that deals with monetary policy by setting inflation directly.
1.1 Private Sector:
Production, wage setting and the aggregate supply function
The economy is characterised by a continuum of firms that are both price
and wage takers and seek to maximise their net of taxes profits,
maxLt(1− τt)PtYt −WtLt
Taxes are incorporated in the model as a fraction on the firms’ revenues
and thus distort the behaviour of firms.4 The production function is given
by Yt = L
η
t , 0 < η < 1. Solving the profit maximisation problem and taking
logs, we can get the aggregate supply equation of the model,
yt = a(pt − wt − τt) + k
where a = η1−η > 0 and k =
η
1−η log η. Lower-case letters denote logs of
nominal variables and τ is the tax rate on the total revenue of firms.
The private sector (individuals) sets nominal wage contracts one period
in advance, in a competitive labour market, which is thus populated by a
continuum of uncoordinated small agents.
















which implies that since wages are set in advance, the best each individ-
ual can do is set wt = p
e
t , or equivalently
5 piet = pit.
The assumption of a continuum of uncoordinated individuals that the
best they can do is to predict inflation correct could be interpreted as in-
dividuals not acting strategically, but competitively by maximising always
their objective. The model, thus, concentrates on the strategic interaction
among the two ‘big’ players.
4Alternatively and leading to the same implications, an income tax could be considered.
5Alesina and Tabellini (1987) assume that the labour market is populated by a strong






t(wt − pt − v)
2, where v is
the real wage target. Consequently, the aggregate supply specification becomes: yt =
yn + a(pit − pi
e
t − τt − v). However, since monetary policy inconsistency can arise solely
from distortionary taxation, we will assume that v = 0.
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Using the best the private sector can do (pit = pi
e
t ) the aggregate supply
can be rewritten as
yt = yn + a(pit − pi
e
t − τt) (2)
where yn = k is the level of output that would prevail in the absence of
monetary policy shocks and taxation (i.e. the natural level of output).
From equation (2) it becomes apparent that the private sector aims at
the market-determined level of output (yn − aτt), which is distorted due to
taxation.
Note that we abstract from imperfections in both the goods and the
labour markets. These simplifying assumptions allow us to concentrate on
the effects of the existence of distortionary taxation on the incentives of the
policymakers and their policy decisions.
1.2 Fiscal Authority
The government is introduced in the model by controlling the fiscal instru-
ments tax rate (τt), government spending (gt) and debt (dt). The govern-
ment budget constraint in nominal terms is given by:
PtGt = φτtPtYt +Mt −Mt−1 + PtDt − (1 + r)PtDt−1
where Gt, Dt, Dt−1 and r are real variables, 0 < φ < 1 shows the degree
of tax-collection inefficiency (i.e. the degree of bureaucratic corruption) and
debt is indexed and matures after one period.
Following Canzoneri (1985), money demand is represented by a very
simple quantity theory of money equation, which depends only on an output
level that is independent of fiscal policy (taxes), Mt = PtY¯ . This implies
that inflation is equivalent to money creation. Since money demand does
not depend on distortionary output (i.e. taxes) or nominal interest rate (i.e.
expected inflation), the fiscal authority is not subject to time-inconsistency
problems.6 The government has no incentive to change taxes after the public
has set its expectations.
The government budget constraint at t can be rewritten in real terms
as:
gt = pit + φτt + dt − (1 + ρ)dt−1 for t = 1, 2 (3)
where gt, dt, dt−1 are expressed as shares of the non-distortionary output




6If money demand depended on output, which is a function of taxes, then inflation
would be determined partially through money growth and partially through tax growth
(pit = ∆mt + a∆τt) and the government would be facing time-inconsistent incentives.
Further, if money demand depended on inflation expectations as well, then expected
inflation could alter people’s money holdings, and in this case it would be expected as well
as unexpected inflation having real effects.
7Equation (3) is derived by dividing the government budget constraint by PtY¯ and
represents a good approximation if Yt is close to Y¯ .
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[τt + pit]− (1 + ρ)d0
Government finances its spending and debt payments through taxes,
seigniorage, and newly issued debt. In our two-period model, the govern-
ment cannot issue new debt in period 2 (i.e. d2 = 0) and the only benefit
from positive inflation is seigniorage.













pi2t + λ1(yt − yn)




where λi > 0, for i = 1, 2, and 0 < g
∗ < 1 and
ut = pi
2
t + λ1(yt − yn)
2 + λ2(gt − g
∗)2 is the instantaneous loss function.
The government faces the conventional loss function, with a negative
sign in order to represent social welfare. In this utility function specification
the weights on the function’s arguments are set relative to inflation, with
inflation’s weight normalised to unity. In that sense, the government shares
the same discount factor and relative weights as society, and λi for i = 1, 2
correspond to the weights the government (society) puts on output and
government spending respectively relative to inflation.
Despite the benefits of inflation on government revenues, society’s in-
flation target corresponds to price stability, since society would be better
off with zero inflation. The output target is the natural level of output,
yn, implying that the policymakers aim at achieving a non-distortionary
level of output. Hence, with no distortions (τt = 0) there is no output goal
conflict among the policymakers and the private sector. Finally, following
Debelle and Fischer’s (1994) interpretation, the government spending target
(g∗) represents the optimal share of non-distortionary output (Y¯ ) to be al-
located on public goods provision, if non-distortionary taxes were available.
1.3 Monetary Authority
The central bank is responsible for monetary policy and controls inflation
perfectly, since from the money demand specification pit = ∆mt. The mon-
etary authority is subject to time-inconsistency problems, since from (2) it
can use surprise inflation to stimulate output, which is considered ‘too low’
due to distortionary taxation.
The objective function of the central bank would generally be of the
form:










βt−1[pi2t + ξ1(yt − yn)
2 + ξ2(gt − g
∗)2] (5)
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where vt = pi
2
t + ξ1(yt − yn)
2 + ξ2(gt − g
∗)2 and ξi for i = 1, 2 represent the
central bank’s relative weights and need not be equal to λi for i = 1, 2.
If ξi = λi for i = 1, 2, both authorities share the same objective function,
and hence we have a centralised authority (the government) being responsi-
ble for both monetary and fiscal policy. Clearly, under this framework, the
policymaker is facing the optimal policy mix and there is no disagreement
regarding the conflicting objectives.
In the case where ξi < λi for i = 1, 2 monetary policy is delegated
to a weight-conservative (Rogoff-type) central bank that is more averse to
inflation. With the explicit incorporation of fiscal policy, ξ2 represents the
degree of fiscal dominance and thus the extent in which the delegated central
bank is ‘forced’ to take fiscal considerations into account when setting its
monetary policy. Thus, the case where the appointed central bank has ξ2 = 0
may be interpreted as the decentralisation of economic policies with the
appointment of an independent central bank. In line with the literature on
central bank independence, ξ2 = 0 corresponds to instrument independence,
as opposed to goal independence since the central bank shares the same
goals as the government.
1.4 First Best
The first best outcome in this framework is given by the centralised au-
thority, which is able to precommit in a world where taxes are not distor-
tionary. In this case, the aggregate supply is no longer distorted by taxes
(yt− yn = a(pit−pi
e
t )), and the government budget constraint is the same as
equation (3), but now the tax rate represents lump-sum taxes as a share of
non-distortionary output (τt = Tt/Y¯ ). The first best outcome results in zero
inflation, yt = yn and gt = g
∗ in both periods. Regarding optimal tax and
debt policy, since those two fiscal instruments are non-distortionary they
turn out to be interchangeable. Any of the two could be used to cover the
desired level of government spending including outstanding debt payments.
Also note that even if the first best world is facing tax-collection inefficien-
cies (i.e. φ < 1), corruption only raises the tax level needed to cover the
government financial requirement of every period. A detailed presentation
of this outcome is given in Appendix A.
2 Second Best
With nonexistent lump-sum taxes, the first best outcome is infeasible. The
second best (SB) of the model can be derived from a centralised authority
that is able to commit when distortionary taxes are apparent. In a two
period model, the commitment outcome of maximising the intertemporal
society’s utility function under the intertemporal constraints is equivalent
to solving the model backwards. Hence, starting from the second period,
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setting pi2 = pi
e
2 and taking d1 as given, second period policy decisions are
optimally chosen, pi2 = f(d1, g
∗) and τ2 = g(d1, g
∗). Then, first period
policy decisions are chosen (including d1), given pi1 = pi
e
1 and given that the
optimal second period decisions will be followed.
• In the Second Period,
The centralised authority is maximising




pi22 + λ1(y2 − yn)
2 + λ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]
Subject to pi2 = pi
e
2
y2 = yn − aτ2
g2 = pi2 + φτ2 − (1 + ρ)d1 i.e. d2 = 0
and d1 predetermined
Thus,





2 + λ2(pi2 + φτ2 − (1 + ρ)d1 − g
∗)2
]
The optimal monetary and fiscal instruments for the second period will
be chosen according to:
τ2 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2




a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2






a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
[(1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗]2 = u2(d1, g
∗) (6)
Social welfare in t = 2 is a negative function of d1 (and g
∗), since a higher
debt accumulation in the previous period requires higher debt servicing costs
this period. Second period inflation is negatively related to the degree of
corruption, as higher corruption (lower φ) leads to higher intratemporal
inflation due to greater reliance on inflation tax revenues. Social welfare is
reduced when corruption increases.
The effect of corruption on second period taxes depends on the size of
φ. If 0 < φ < φ˜, then ∂τ2∂φ > 0, and a reduction in the quality of institutions
will lead to less taxes. The opposite effect occurs if φ˜ < φ < 1, assuming
that φ˜ < 1. In other words, depending on the structure of the economy,
there is a critical value of φ that inverses the effects of corruption on taxes.
Nonetheless, for plausible parameter values φ˜ would be greater than unity,
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implying that corruption deterioration will cause an intratemporal shift away
from taxes.8
Note that the static version of the model is the second period optimal
values with d1 = 0. So, with φ = 1 the outcomes reduce to the Alesina and
Tabellini’s (1987) SB and with φ < 1 to Huang and Wei’s (2005).
• In the First Period,
The centralised authority maximises Ug given that second period polices will
be followed, that is, given that u2 is equal to its maximised value according
to (6).








[pi21 + λ1(y1 − yn)




a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
[(1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗]2
]
Subject to pi1 = pi
e
1
y1 = yn − aτ1
g1 = pi1 + φτ1 + d1 − (1 + ρ)d0
So similarly to period 2 we have:
τ1 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2




a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
[(1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ − d1]
And optimal debt policy is given by:
dSB1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ))g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
(7)
In the SB, the choice of d1 is independent of the structural parameter
values of the model (a, λ1, λ2), including the level of corruption, φ.
Debt is a policy instrument only in one period that has to be repaid
in the next one. First period inflation and taxes are negative functions
of d1, i.e. more d1 implies less pi1 and τ1 to cover government expenditure
(including debt repayment, d0). Second period inflation and taxes, though,
8The critical value of φ is φ˜ = (a
2λ1(1+λ2)
λ2
)1/2. For φ˜ < 1, since λ2/(1 + λ2) < 1 it
should hold that either a or λ1 are less than 1. However, assuming that the share of labour
in the production function is greater than 0.5, so that a > 1, and that λ1 should be a
number very close to 1, φ˜ will be greater than unity.
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are positively related to d1, for the same reasoning.
9 However, the size of φ is
only affecting the shares of seigniorage and taxes in meeting the government
expenditure requirements (plus debt interest and principal payments).
Thus, in this model, debt is just reallocating the burden of raising rev-
enues (through taxation or inflation) among the two periods, and with a
centralised authority that faces the optimal policy mix and has no output
boost incentives, debt does not depend on the corruption level.10 Optimal
debt is driven only from the subjective time preference of society relative to
the rate of return on assets. From equation (9) if for a moment we ignore d0
(either because is close to zero or just an exogenous constant), we see that
the degree of society’s impatience (1/β) relative to rate of return on assets
(1 + ρ) will determine whether society wishes to be a net debtor or a net
borrower. Thus, if β(1 + ρ) > 1 ⇒ 1β < (1 + ρ), then society is better off
accumulating assets and vice versa. If β(1+ρ) = 1, no debt is issued and the
model reduces to the static one-shot game, where current policy instruments
cover current revenue requirements. The effective discount factor, β(1 + ρ),
is inversely related to debt, and in the SB is assumed to be optimal.
Also note that in the SB world inflation is non-zero, unlike the determin-
istic Barro and Gordon (1983) model with exogenous fiscal policy. Positive
inflation arises solely because of government spending considerations and
the incorporation of the government budget constraint in the maximisation
problem. That is, the centralised authority is willing to tolerate some pos-
itive inflation (seigniorage), as it is trading-off among providing more of
public goods and incurring the cost of positive inflation.
Despite the fact the debt policy is independent of φ, all other policy
instruments are not. That is, the SB outcome an economy can achieve
is different for different corruption levels. Hence, an economy that faces
lower quality of institutions will have a SB outcome characterised by higher
inflation, lower taxes (if φ˜ > 1), lower government spending and lower overall
social welfare. Appendix B summarises the SB solution outcome and the
main results.
2.1 Centralised Economic Policy without Commitment
Suppose that the centralised authority is unable to precommit, and thus the
output boost channel of unanticipated inflation is apparent. In this case,
first period debt policy is
dd1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)K)g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2K
9Note that first period debt policy can affect second period policies, and this is the link
between the two periods under dynamic considerations.
10If the corruption level φ is time-variant, then optimal debt would depend on φt for
t = 1, 2. However, in this two period model we assume that φ is time-invariant reflecting
the fact that corruption levels change very sluggishly over time.




2 + φ2λ2 + a
2λ1
a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φλ2(a2λ1 + φ)
> 1 for every φ
Discretionary debt depends on the structural parameters of the model




1 , since K is always greater than
unity. The effective discount factor under discretion (β(1 + ρ)K) is greater
compared to the SB, which implies that second period costs of servicing debt
are increased, and consequently, the centralised authority issues less debt in
the first period.11
The intuition behind this result is that in the static version of the model,
the economy ends up with higher inflation and lower taxes compared to the
(static) SB in both periods.12 Due to time-inconsistent monetary policy, the
government is collecting too much revenue in the form of inflation and too
little in the form of taxes (intratemporal imbalance). In the dynamic version
of the model with discretion, however, though first period inflation expecta-
tions are taken as given, second period inflation expectations are not; they
can still be affected by first period debt policy. The same applies to second
period inflation and taxes. Thus, pie2 = h(d1), and pi2 = f(d1), τ2 = g(d1).
In other words, the centralised authority will use first period debt policy
to affect second period outcomes and try and ‘correct’ the intratemporal
imbalance of the second period. It uses debt to restrict itself from deliv-
ering too much inflation in the second period. That is why, discretionary
debt depends on society’s time preference relative to not only the rate of
returns on assets but also K, which reflects intratemporal considerations.13
In doing so, centralised discretionary policies result in both intratemporal
and intertemporal imbalances (or distortions) compared to the SB.
The discretionary outcome under a centralised authority is again depend-
ing on the quality of institutions, since all choice variables are a function of
φ. Under some conditions, it holds that intratemporal imbalances are higher
for higher levels of institutional quality. Furthermore, quality of institutions
is negatively related to debt. Lower institutional quality increases debt and
it is the higher institutional quality economies that restrict themselves more






where φL, φH correspond to lower and higher quality respectively.
Intuitively, since higher institutional quality leads to more intratemporal
distortions, the incentive to correct them is higher. Hence, the higher qual-
11See also Obstfeld (1991), Jensen (1994), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997).
12The two period model without dynamic considerations, i.e. without debt, is equivalent
to the one-shot game’s outcome in both periods.
13Recall that K summarises the intratemporal effects of inflation, tax and government
spending on social welfare, according to the maximised value of equation (4) for t = 2.
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ity economy accumulates more assets. This result is further motivated by
the fact that high quality translates into more efficient tax systems, giving
the opportunity for lowering debt further down but still having adequate
revenues.
Note however that our model could be overstating the disaccumulation
of debt since reputational issues and private sector’s strategic behaviour are
ignored. A summary of the discretionary outcome and the main findings is
presented in Appendix C.
3 Delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative
(Rogoff-type) central bank
According to Alesina and Tabellini (1987), in line with Rogoff (1985), de-
centralising economic policies and delegating monetary policy to a more
conservative central bank can improve upon the (static) discretionary equi-
librium, when a commitment mechanism is not available.14
Suppose that monetary policy is delegated to a more conservative central
bank. Due to the objective function specification, this translates into lower
weights on the output and government spending arguments relative to infla-
tion (i.e. ξi < λi, i = 1, 2). None of the policymakers is able to precommit.
The solution is again obtained backwards.
• In the Second Period:
The government and the central bank maximise their objective functions
with respect to τ2 and pi2 respectively, for given d1 and taking second period
inflation expectations as given.




pi22 + λ1(y2 − yn)
2 + λ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]




pi22 + ξ1(y2 − yn)
2 + ξ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]
Subject to y2 − yn = a(pi2 − pi
e
2 − τ2)
g2 = pi2 + φτ2 − (1 + ρ)d1
The private sector forms expectations according to the first order con-




a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
[(1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗]
14The discretionary equilibrium in Alesina and Tabellini (1987) is exhibiting only in-
tratemporal distortions.






a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)










[a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1]2
[(1+ρ)d1+g
∗]2 = u2(d1, g
∗)
(8)
• Similarly, in the First Period:
The fiscal and monetary authorities maximise their objective functions
with respect to τ1, d1 and pi1 respectively, taking first period inflation expec-



























Subject to y1 − yn = a(pi1 − pi
e
1 − τ1)
g1 = pi1 + φτ1 + d1 − (1 + ρ)d0
where u2 is given by equation (8).
Note that it is only the fiscal authority that can affect second period
policies (including second period inflation expectations and society’s utility)
through d1. In contrast, the monetary authority cannot affect the second
period, since pi1 can only affect current period outcomes, hence v2(d1, g
∗)
need not be derived.
Solving the maximisation problems simultaneously, and after the private
sector forms its inflation expectations, we get:
τ1 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)







a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
[(1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ − d1]
And discretionary debt policy is given by:
d dmc1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)M)g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2M
(9)
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a2λ1λ2[a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)]
Under decentralised and discretionary policymakers, optimal debt policy
depends on intertemporal (β(1+ ρ)) and intratemporal (M) considerations.
The magnitude of M (compared to unity) will depend on the central bank’s
weights (i.e. degree of conservatism) relative to government’s weights and
the level of corruption.
To find the optimal degree of conservatism, one needs to find the ξi, i =
1, 2 that maximise society’s welfare under decentralisation. Thus setting,
∂Udmc,g
∂ξi
= 0 for i = 1, 2
yields the optimality condition for ξ1, ξ2:




This implies that optimal ξ2 is a linear function of ξ1, due to the quadratic
specification of the policymakers objective function. In other words, the op-
timal reduction of the weight the central bank puts on government spending
depends on society’s initial weights, λ1, λ2, on the degree of corruption, φ,
and on the optimal reduction of the central bank’s weight on output, ξ1.
Hence, there are infinite combinations of ξ1, ξ2 that can maximise U
dmc,g,
which are bounded by 0 ≤ ξi ≤ λi, i = 1, 2.
The optimality condition for ξi, i = 1, 2 manages to correct for both
the intertemporal and intratemporal imbalances of discretionary policy and
hence attain the SB, unlike in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997).15 That is,




1 , and at
the same time Udmc,g = USB.
Note also, from equation (10), that both ξ1, ξ2 are inversely related to the
quality of institutions. Lower quality (smaller φ) requires higher ξi (i.e. less
conservative central banks). The reason for this result is that a low value for
φ implies more costly tax collection, and hence a less effective tax system.
Thus, the government would like to rely more on seigniorage. However, since
monetary policy is no longer controlled by the government, this increased
15Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) using a slightly different loss function and abstracting
from corruption issues, end up with a value for M that is always greater than unity.
Consequently, their optimal degree of conservatism corrects only for the intratemporal
misallocations. This result is driven by the money demand specification, Mt/Pt = κY¯
that incorporates a velocity of money term, κ, and from the fact that they concentrate
on coordinated monetary and fiscal policies by minimising a weighted average of the two
policymakers’ loss functions.
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need for seigniorage translates into higher values for ξ1 (higher central bank’s
incentive to boost distorted output through unanticipated inflation) or ξ2
(higher central bank’s consideration for government spending when setting
inflation) or any combination of the two, according to (10).
4 Some special static cases
4.1 Static model without corruption
As mentioned above, with d1 = 0 and φ = 1 the model becomes static and
reduces to Alesina and Tabellini’s (1987) paper. According to their main
argument, starting from the situation where both authorities share the same
weights (i.e. ξi = λi) and decreasing the weights for the central bank results
in higher discretionary utility. In other words,
∂Ud
∂ξi |ξi=λi
< 0, for i = 1, 2
Nonetheless, this differentiation outcome holds for ξj , j 6= i, j = 1, 2 con-
stant and utility is increased when ξi decreases locally.
Following and extending this finding, we can actually find the optimal
ξ1, ξ2 that maximise U
dmc,g and attain the SB. Equation (10) for φ = 1
gives:
ξi = λi −
λi
λj
ξj , for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i (11)
If it is further assumed that a more conservative central bank translates into
increasing the absolute weight on inflation, while the absolute weights on
output and government spending remain constant, then both ξ1 and ξ2 would
be reduced by the same amount. In other words, if we directly increase the
weight on inflation from 1 to (1 + s), s > 0, keeping the relative weights on
the other two arguments of the objective function the same, we would have
Uˆ = −12 [(1 + s)pi
2 + λ1(y − yn)
2 + λ2(g − g
∗)2] so that ξi =
λi
1+s , i = 1, 2.








⇒ s = 1
Thus, the optimal aversion to inflation should be doubled, and conse-
quently, the relative weights on output and government spending that the
central bank attaches to should be reduced by half. Thus, optimal ξi, i = 1, 2
are ξi = λi/2.
4.1.1 Independent Central Bank
Suppose monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank. This
would imply that ξ2 = 0, since the central bank is not taking into account
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budgetary concerns, and hence is not fiscally dominated. From the opti-
mality condition, equation (11), optimal relative weight on output would be
ξ1 = λ1, and the SB outcome would again be obtained.
Thus, in the static model with φ = 1, when monetary policy is dele-
gated to an independent central bank (ξ2 = 0), the SB outcome is achieved,
without the need for delegating a more conservative central banker; the
independent central bank should share society’s relative weight on output
(ξ1 = λ1).
The intuition for the limiting case of (ξ2 = 0, ξ1 = λ1) is as follows.
With ξ2 = 0 the central bank is not internalising the government budget
constraint in its policy decisions and completely ignores seigniorage benefits.
The monetary authority still faces the incentive to cause surprise inflation
so as to stimulate distorted output (ξ1 6= 0). Hence, the setting of inflation
depends only on the level of taxes (i.e. distortions) and on how important
the effect of these distortions on output relative to inflation are perceived
to be (i.e. level of ξ1). However, with endogenous fiscal policy, the degree
of distorted output depends on the level of taxes set and the government
still considers seigniorage revenues important (λ2 > 0). Consequently, the
government delegates an independent central bank with such a weight on
output considerations (ξ1 = λ1) that its choice of SB taxes (τ
SB) would
induce the SB level of inflation.
The maximisation problem an independent central bank faces yields
a first order condition for inflation, after private sector expectations are
formed, according to: pi = a2ξ1τ , which is the same result when mone-
tary policy is considered alone and τ is an exogenous constant (Barro and
Gordon 1983). However, when τ is a choice variable, delegating an indepen-






a2λ1(1 + λ2) + λ2
= piSB
4.2 Introduce corruption to the static model
When the issue of the quality of institutions is introduced in the static case,
the model reduces to Huang and Wei (2005). In this case, we established
that optimal monetary and fiscal policy are functions of φ, and this could
provide a justification for countries with higher levels of corruption to be
targeting higher inflation levels, unlike advanced countries that face better
quality of institutions, according to one of their main arguments.
Extending on their work, this paper establishes that delegating an in-
dependent central bank no longer attains the SB, unless, according to (10)
ξ1 = λ1/φ > λ1, that is, unless a less conservative than society central bank
is chosen. The reason for this different result stems from the fact that now an
independent central bank is also ignoring the capability of the tax-collection
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mechanism in raising revenues through the formal tax channel. In other
words, it is not taking into account that a lower φ implies a more costly
tax system and a higher reliance on inflation tax from the perspective of
the government. That is why, with the introduction of tax-collection leak-
ages and a non-fiscally dominated central bank, for the SB to be achieved,
the government wishes to appoint monetary policy to an independent cen-
tral bank with a negative degree of conservatism on output considerations
relative to its own.
5 Dynamics and Corruption
In the dynamic case with φ < 1, again for the SB to be achieved with an
independent central bank, a less conservative central bank regarding output
considerations should be appointed. Thus, the introduction of debt is not
qualitatively altering the outcome of the static case.
When the economy is facing tax inefficiencies and ξ1 = λ1, then the
optimal ξ2 should be equal to 0 < ξ
∗
2 = λ2(1 − φ) < λ2, according to the
optimality condition, stated in equation (10). Hence, some level of fiscal
dominance should be permitted.
However, whenever an independent central bank with ξ2 = 0and ξ1 ≤ λ1
(or ξ1 < λ1/φ) is legislatively constituted, a new aspect emerges in a dynamic
environment; the government faces the incentive to use debt strategically,
since first period debt relates to second period monetary and fiscal setting.
In this case, M with ξ2 = 0 becomes
16:





a2λ1λ2 [a2λ1 + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)]
< 1,
for every ξ1 <
λ1
φ
and hence for every ξ1 ≤ λ1
And dICB1 =
(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)N)g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2N
where ‘ICB’ stands for discretion under an independent central bank.
For ξ1 < λ1/φ, the effective discount factor of the government, β(1+ρ)N ,
is smaller compared to the SB one (β(1 + ρ)) and society values less the
costs of servicing debt. Hence, the effective discount factor is such that the
government intertemporally shifts its financial requirements away from the
first and towards the second period, by issuing more debt compared to the







(1 + β)(1 + ρ)2N)(1 + β(1 + ρ)2)
[





16Recall thatM is one component of the effective discount factor, β(1+ρ)M , according
to which the government sets its debt policy.
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Thus, if the government is unable to affect the degree of conservatism of
the central bank or it cannot appoint such a less conservative central bank
as to obtain the SB due to political reasons, it can use debt in order to affect
second period monetary policy because monetary policy is considered too
conservative from the ex ante perspective of the government, delivering too
little inflation in both periods. More precisely, the government strategically
accumulates debt so as to increase second period taxes, which in turn distort
output further and hence induce the central bank to increase second period
inflation (indirect channel). Note that in this case (with ξ2 = 0) the channel
through which debt affects second period inflation is different from the case
of a more conservative central bank where both ξi > 0 and d1 affects pi2
(and pie2) directly, presented in Section 3.
17
This outcome suggests that more conservative monetary policy induces
the government to use debt in order to increase second period inflation,
despite the fact that monetary policy is free from any fiscal dominance phe-
nomena.18
A direct implication that can be observed is that there is a range of
ξ1, namely, λ1 < ξ1 < λ1/φ, that even if a less conservative independent
central bank is appointed, the government finds it optimal to accumulate
debt in order to increase second period inflation. The lower is the quality
of institutions (smaller φ), the greater is this range. Higher levels of tax
inefficiency imply more costly tax revenues and higher SB inflation levels.
Hence, the government requires more and more loose monetary policy in
order to cover its spending requirements through seigniorage.
5.1 Debt Behaviour
In order to analyse the debt behaviour and hence inflation dynamics of
an economy that faces tax inefficiencies we should explore the factors that
decrease N further from unity. N and hence the effective discount factor of
the government, (β(1 + ρ)N), is a function of all the structural parameters
of the model (λ1, λ2, φ), as well as the degree of central bank conservatism,
ξ1.
The government’s relative weight on government spending, λ2, is always
a negative function of the effective discount factor. Hence, the more the
government cares about government spending relative to inflation, (higher
λ2), the more it is inclined to accumulated debt, (higher d
ICB
1 ).
λ1, ξ1, φ are non-linear functions of N and there are critical values of the
17The same applies to the solution of a discretionary centralised economy of Section 2.1
In general, whenever ξ2 > 0, debt affects pi2 directly, since d1 appears in the FOCpi2 . This
is what we call the direct channel.
18This is one of the possibilities that arise in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). However,
their outcome is driven from restrictions on the velocity of money, parameter (κ), and not
due to corruption.
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variables that switch their effect on N , and consequently on the effective
discount factor and first period debt policy. We will analyse each of them
in more detail.

































where D = a2λ1 + φλ2(φ+ a
2ξ1)
• Government’s relative weight on output: λ1
Unlike λ2, the relative weight the government attaches to output consider-
ations (λ1) is a non-linear function of N . The reason for this is that the
intertemporal shift towards or away from debt accumulation depends on the
government’s weight on output relative to the central bank’s conservatism























For values of λ1 up to λ
∗
1, N is negatively related to λ1. For relatively
small values of λ1, an increase in the relative weight of output induces the
government to issue more debt. That is, despite the increased government’s
aversion to output distortions, it still finds it optimal to increase debt, so
as to increase second period taxes, and distort output, which would in turn
put upward pressure on inflation in the second period. The value of λ1 that
19This is not the case, though, for λ2 because ξ2 = 0. In other words, since ξ2 = 0 it is
only the government that cares about government spending, so irrespective of the initial
value of λ2, the more weight attached to government spending, the more the revenues the
government wants to raise through both tax and inflation tax. However, since ξ1 > 0,
the response of the government to changes in λ1 will partially depend on the weight the
central bank attaches to output given the efficiency of the tax system.
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obtains the SB, given ξ1, φ, is always on the negatively sloped part on N(λ1),
as it can be seen in Figure 1(c).
It is after λ1 takes the value of twice the one that would obtain the
SB that the opposite effect takes place. That is, for λ1 > λ
∗
1 > 2φξ1, λ1
is positively related to N and the government, caring more about output
distortions, is not engaging in debt accumulation.
Nonetheless, in the subsequent analysis we will consider λ1 (and λ2) as
given and try to see how different degrees of central bank conservatism (ξ1),
and more importantly how different levels of quality of institutions (φ), lead




• Central bank’s relative weight on output: ξ1
Regarding the degree of central bank’s conservatism, there is a critical
value of ξ1 that provides the global minimum for N as a function of ξ1,
keeping the other parameters fixed.
∂N
∂ξ1
= 0⇒ ξ∗1 =
[(a2λ1 + φ
2λ2)(a
2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ
2λ2)]
1/2 − (a2λ1 + φ
2λ2)
a2λ2φ
and 0 < ξ∗1 <
λ1
2φ












That is, for relatively small values of ξ1, 0 < ξ1 < ξ
∗
1 , a further increase in
the central bank’s degree of conservatism (lower ξ1), increases N and hence
the effective discount factor. Since the future matters more, the government
reduces debt.20 Further reduction in ξ1 does not engage the government in
debt accumulation, since the government knows that the central bank (being
very inflation averse) will barely raise inflation in response to higher debt
repayment in the second period and refrains from issuing debt. In other
words, the costs of increased debt (higher second period taxes) outweigh
the benefits (higher second period inflation) and hence first period debt is
reduced.
For relatively higher values of ξ1, namely, ξ
∗
1 < ξ1 < λ1/φ, delegating
a more conservative independent central bank (reducing ξ1), decreases the
effective discount factor and induces the government to accumulate debt, in
an attempt to increase second period seigniorage revenues. That is, given the
other structural parameters (a, λ1, λ2, φ), the degree of conservatism is such
20Note that in this interval, ξ1 could actually be greater than λ1, depending of φ.
Actually, for small values of φ (with certainty for φ < 1/2), it is the case that ξ1 > λ1.
However, the smaller is φ the more loose monetary policy is required for the SB to be
attained, which implies that even if λ1 < ξ1 < λ1/φ, the central bank is too conservative
from the government’s point of view.
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that lowering ξ1 in the region of (ξ
∗
1 , λ1/φ) induces the government to shift
its financial requirements towards the second period by increasing debt in
the first period. Here the cost of increasing debt is lower than the benefit as
the central bank cares enough about output distortions for the government
to use the debt mechanism in order to push second period inflation up.
• Quality of institutions: φ
Regarding the quality of institutions, again, there is a critical value of φ
that gives the global minimum ofN as a function of φ. Quality of institutions
is non-linear in N and the effective discount factor. There are, hence, levels
of corruption that do not result in debt accumulation.
∂N
∂φ






and 0 < φ∗ <
λ1
2ξ1
For 0 < φ < φ∗ ⇒
∂N
∂φ




For relatively small values of φ, φ ∈ (0, φ∗), a further deterioration in
the quality of institutions is increasing the costs of servicing debt beyond
the benefits, which results in asset accumulation. The intuition behind this
outcome is as follows. With 0 < φ < φ∗ a further reduction in φ is making
taxes even more inefficient in the sense that, despite their distortionary effect
on output and the subsequent positive response of inflation, overall revenues
get smaller due to the negative impact of tax revenues. Consequently, taxes
become a too costly tool to be used by the government so as to induce
the central bank to deliver higher inflation by increasing first period debt.
In other words, there is a range of poor quality of institutions (relative
to the other parameters) that a further deterioration makes the potential
mechanism the government has in affecting second period monetary policy
prohibitively costly.
However, for φ > φ∗, given that φ∗ ≤ 1, more corruption (lower φ)
reduces the effective discount factor, which results in higher first period
debt. This result suggests that for φ > φ∗, we would expect economies with
lower quality of institutions to exhibit higher increasing public debt levels
with the introduction of central bank independence, and higher debt levels
compared to economies that exhibit better quality of institutions.
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Figure 1 summarises the previous discussion by depicting the effects of
ξ1, λ1 andφ onN graphically.






























Figure 1: N(ξ1), N(φ) and N(λ1) respectively
Despite the non-linearities of the above parameters onN one can observe,
either from Table 1 or Figure 1, that whenever 2φξ1−λ1 > 0 ⇒ φ > λ1/2ξ1








That is, we can pinpoint only one sufficient condition under which a
further increase in the central bank’s conservatism (lower ξ1) or a further
deterioration in quality of institutions (lower φ) would lead to higher debt
accumulation.
Furthermore, starting from the point where an independent central bank
with ξ1 = λ1 has been in place and concentrating on reasonably realistic
levels of corruption22 (i.e. for φ > 1/2) it holds that an economy would be
accumulating more debt if
• it faces lower quality of institutions, ∂N∂φ |ξ1=λ1
> 0
• it appoints a more conservative central bank , ∂N∂ξ1 |ξ1=λ1
> 0
21It also holds that ∂N
∂λ1
< 0. However, we concentrate only on the effects of ξ1 and φ
assuming that the government’s relative weights (λ1, λ2) are given.
22Having a φ < 1/2 would imply that more than half of the tax revenues never reach the
treasury and would correspond to severe levels of corruption. We abstract from such severe
levels of corruption. However, even if they do apply in reality, such countries are more
likely to be also facing debt constraints and underdeveloped financial systems and would
be more reluctant to give up seigniorage revenues by introducing independent monetary
policy regimes.
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5.2 Inflation Dynamics
In the previous section we established that for ξ1 < λ1/φ, N < 1 and
hence there are both intratemporal and intertemporal distortions that do
not allow for the SB the be restored. Given the delegated parameters
(ξ2 = 0, ξ1 < λ1/φ) the monetary authority is intratemporally overcorrect-
ing for inflation and consequently the fiscal authority is taxing too much
and government spending is too low. Hence, an intratemporal distortion
appears with inflation being too low in both periods, which is augmented
by lower quality of institutions.23
In this situation, N < 1 and the government has the incentive to use
debt in an attempt to correct this intratemporal imbalance, generating an
intertemporal one. However, the intertemporal shift of the government to-
wards second period inflation makes price stability ambiguous in a dynamic
environment with an independent central bank in contrast to the static case.
Therefore, we will now turn our attention to the effects of debt policy on
second period inflation setting by concentrating on changes on the central
bank’s delegated parameter ξ1, since it raises the possibility of the unpleas-
ant monetarist arithmetics of Sargent and Wallace (1981) to take place.
We have established that there is a range of ξ1, ξ1 ∈ (ξ
∗
1 , λ1/φ) in which
a further reduction in ξ1 leads to more debt. This result implies that there is
scope for the unpleasant monetarist arithmetics to emerge, in the case where
a decline in ξ1 results in an increase in second period inflation. Inflation is




a2λ1 + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
)(
(1 + ρ)














The intratemporal factor (T1) is always positively related to ξ1; A more
conservative central bank reduces T1, which tends to reduce inflation in both
periods. The effect of the intertemporal factor (T2) on inflation, though,
depends on the value of ξ1. For relatively small values of ξ1, ξ1 ∈ (0, ξ
∗
1),
a further decrease in ξ1 shifts the intertemporal factor away from second
period inflation and towards first period inflation. In this case the two
effects reinforce each other. However, for ξ1 ∈ (ξ
∗
1 , λ1/φ), decreasing ξ1
induces the government to accumulate debt, which tends to increase second
period inflation (and reduce first period inflation). Hence, for relatively
higher values of ξ1, the intertemporal and intratemporal effects move to
different directions.
23Actually, for a given ξ1 < λ1/φ lower quality of institutions (smaller φ) leads the
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Therefore, if with a decrease in ξ1 the intertemporal effect (T2) dominates
the intratemporal one (T1), then the appointment of a more conservative in-
dependent central bank results in inflation boosts in the longer run (Sargent
and Wallace 1981). This will take place if
ξ1 > ξ˜1 =
(





because in this case
∂piICB2
∂ξ1
< 0. Also note that ξ˜1 > ξ
∗
1 .
For ξ1 > ξ˜1, delegating a more conservative independent central bank
(lower ξ1) results in higher second period inflation, because the government
is issuing so much debt that the intertemporal shift towards second period
inflation outweighs the intratemporal shift away from it.
5.3 An example
In this section we use a numerical example so as to visualise better the
results stated in the previous sections. We parallel two cases in which the
only difference lies on the level of the quality of institutions.
We assume that λ1 = 1.2 and λ2 = 1.7. That is, 1 < λ1 < λ2, and the
weights in the social welfare function are such that the government values
output and government spending a bit more relative to inflation deviations
from their targets. Furthermore, consistent with empirical findings, the
share of labour in production, η, is set equal to 0.6, which implies that
a = 1.5 > 1. Appendix D explains the implications of the chosen param-
eter values for the SB, the centralised discretionary and the central bank
independence regime in more detail.
We distinguish two cases with different levels of corruption. In the first
case the economy faces high quality of institutions, φH = 0.95 and the
inefficiency of the tax system is minor, since it is only a small portion (5%)
of tax revenues that goes wasted. In contrast, in the second case the economy
suffers from a very high level of bureaucratic corruption, since φL = 0.60
and 40% of the tax revenues do not reach the treasury.
Regarding the SB outcome the two economies can achieve, since in both
cases φ < 1, a less conservative than society central bank should be delegated
(assuming ξ2 = 0). Nonetheless, in the case with low quality of institutions
(φ = 0.6) for the SB to be obtained a much less conservative independent
central bank (ξSB1 = 2) is required, compared to the case with high quality,
where ξSB1 = 1.26.
Lower quality of institutions translates into a SB solution with higher
inflation, lower taxes, lower output gap, lower government spending and
lower overall social welfare. In other words, the best an economy can achieve
in a SB world is restricted by the quality of institutions it is subject to.
Furthermore, since in this framework inflation is equivalent to seigniorage
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Figure 2: N(ξ1) and different qualities of institutions
our analysis suggests that the reliance on seigniorage is very limited for
economies with small levels of corruption, contrary to cases with severer tax
inefficiencies.
Comparing the case where both economies have delegated independent
central banks with ξ2 = 0 and ξ1 = λ1 it is established that the low institu-
tional quality economy accumulates more debt compared to the high quality
one.




1 ) ξ1 N(ξ1 = λ1)
φH = 0.95 1.2632 1 0.9746
ξ1 = λ1 = 1.2
φL = 0.6 2 1 0.8184
As shown in Table 2 for economies which face high quality of institutions,
as it is expected in many advanced economies, delegating an independent
central bank gives a value of N(= 0.9746) very close to unity. On the
contrary, when φL = 0.6, N(= 0.8184) is smaller, which implies higher
debt accumulation. This is so because when an economy is facing large tax
inefficiency issues it stands further away from its SB position when ξ1 = λ1
and hence issues more debt in an attempt to achieve its higher SB level
of second period inflation. This result is enhanced by the fact that the
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low quality economy is overcorrecting for inflation even more than the high
quality economy delivering even lower inflation in both periods compared to
the optimal level. For more details regarding how φ affects intratemporal
distortions under central bank independence see Appendix D.3.
Another way of analysing debt dynamics under different levels of cor-
ruption is through a comparative statics exercise. Here, we focus on a com-
parison in which ξ1 is reduced (from its respective SB level) by the same
percentage and compare the percentage increase in debt for the two cases.
The result is that the economy with low quality of institutions exhibits a
higher debt increase. Suppose that both economies are at their SB so that
ξ1 = λ1/φ, forφ = φH , φL. However, due to political pressures or due to
an attempt to enhance the credibility of the newly introduced independent
central bank, ξ1 is considered ‘too high’. Therefore, the government decides
to appoint a central bank with a higher degree of conservatism (smaller ξ1)
and more precisely, with a ξ1 that is 20% lower than the SB one.
Table 4: A percentage comparison
φ ξ1 N(ξ1)




1 = 1.0106 0.9071




1 = 1.6 0.8948
Thus, for the high quality of institutions economy ξ1 reduces to 1.01 and for
the low quality economy to 1.6, andN reduces by 9% and 10.5% respectively,
as shown in Table 4. Consequently, the economy with low institutional
quality will experience a higher debt increase.
Furthermore, though not presented here, the lower quality economy will
experience a higher increase in inflation relative to the case where the gov-
ernment decides to continue behaving optimally and issuing no debt despite
the non-optimal delegated parameter. Hence, the low institutional quality
economy will also be facing higher difficulties in lowering inflation.
Finally, we will analyse the effects of a change in the monetary policy
regime, from discretionary monetary and fiscal policy under a centralised
economy to the appointment of an independent central bank with ξ2 = 0
and ξ1 = λ1. Such a regime shift induces the the low quality economy to
accumulate more debt.
Suppose that initially in both economies monetary and fiscal policy are
determined by a centralised authority that is unable to precommit. This
regime results in the outcomes presented in Section 2.1. In this case, we
have established that the effective discount factor of the centralised economy,
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Kβ(1+ρ), is greater than the SB and the economy is accumulating less debt,
since K > 1 ∀φ.
In our example, for the case where φH = 0.95, K = 1.64, though for
φL = 0.6,K = 1.41. That is, the economy facing high institutional quality
issues less debt (i.e. accumulates more assets) than the economy with high
corruption issues. Given the chosen parameters, the intratemporal distortion
of excessive inflation is higher in the high institutional quality economy. For
more details refer to Appendix D.2.
Note that the simple model incorporated here abstracts from reputa-
tional issues and the private sector does not behave strategically. Hence,
the centralised discretionary policies overstate the disaccumulation of debt.
In other words, the centralised economy regime results in a debt policy set-
ting that is not very realistic. Allowing for reputational issues would result
in lower intratemporal inflation and consequently lower asset accumulation.
Table 5: Regime Shift Comparison
Discretion Under a Centralised Economy
ξ1, ξ2 φ K
φH = 0.95 1.64
ξ1 = λ1 = 1.2
ξ2 = λ2 = 1.7 φL = 0.6 1.41
Delegation of Monetary policy
ξ1, ξ2 φ N
φH = 0.95 0.9746
ξ1 = λ1 = 1.2
ξ2 = 0 φL = 0.6 0.8184
Starting from the situation of a centralised economy and delegating mon-
etary policy to an independent central bank that shares the same weight on
output considerations as the government will result in different debt policies
for different institutional qualities. This monetary policy regime shift would
result in a sizable, but not equal, reduction in the effective discount factor
and essentially in N in both cases. However, a considerable part of the debt
increase is attributable to the fact that under a centralised authority debt is
much lower from its SB value. Consequently, the debt increase implied by
the reduction of the effective discount factor from Kβ(1+ ρ) to β(1+ ρ) (or
equivalently from K to 1) is necessary for the correction of the intertemporal
distortions the centralised economy has been generating.
We see from table 5 that the regime reform from a discretionary cen-
tralised policymaking to the delegation of monetary policy to an independent
central bank results in an overall reduction in the effective discount factor of
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40.5% for the high quality economy and of 42% for the low quality economy.
However, concentrating on that part of the debt increase attributable to the
introduction of the independent central bank that overcorrects for inflation
beyond the SB point (or equivalently isolating that part of the debt increase
that is attributable to the correction of the intratemporal distortions of the
centralised economy) we observe that for the high quality economy the effec-
tive discount factor is reduced further from the SB by only 1.55%, though for
the low quality economy by 12%. Hence, the low quality economy will expe-
rience a much higher debt increase with the introduction of an independent
central bank.
It becomes apparent that high quality of institutions has two major
advantages. Firstly, it corresponds to a better SB solution, compared to
cases with lower φ. Secondly, and equally important, the delegation of an
independent central bank (with ξ1 = λ1) provides a solution to the lack of a
commitment technology very close to the SB. The small debt accumulation
can be easily corrected by a marginal increase in ξ1 = λ1/φ.
In contrast, low institutional quality limits the economy’s situation in
a second best world. SB inflation is higher and this could pose difficul-
ties in controlling and lowering inflation, unless the quality of institutions
is improved. Even if monetary policy is delegated to an independent cen-
tral bank, the government has a higher incentive to use first period debt
policy in an attempt to increase second period inflation, the higher corrup-
tion is. Hence, economies facing higher corruption issues will experience
higher debt increases and consequently increased upward pressure in infla-
tion with the introduction of central bank independence. This result could
provide an explanation for the divergent and generally poorer inflation per-
formance of emerging market economies that have introduced central bank
independence, and, at the same time, it poses difficulties for a balanced debt
process.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a deterministic model where fiscal policy is endogenised;
the new player, the government, is allowed to issue public debt and the qual-
ity of the tax system is allowed to differ from optimal, modelling this way
bureaucratic corruption. Thus, the objective function of the policymakers
is augmented to incorporate a government spending argument, and the gov-
ernment budget constraint is augmented with a tax inefficiency parameter,
φ. We abstract, however, from stochastic issues and any labour or goods
market imperfections, since distortionary taxes alone can induce monetary
policy time-inconsistency problems. Consequently, distortions and hence
monetary policy inflation bias are endogenised, and the monetary authority
is fiscally dominated. Setting up a two period model, dynamic considerations
are introduced and with 0 < φ < 1 quality of institutions is considered.
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In this environment, the second best (SB) is given by the commitment
outcome under a centralised authority. The SB solution is a function of the
quality of institutions, and lower quality (i.e. more corruption) results in
higher SB inflation, lower taxes (under some conditions), lower SB provision
of public goods and lower social welfare. Nonetheless, if a commitment
mechanism is not available, centralised policies will be discretionary and
lead to both intertemporal and intratemporal misallocations compared to
the SB.
We find that if the tax system is purely efficient (φ = 1), delegating an
independent central bank (i.e. not fiscally dominated, ξ2 = 0) achieves the
SB without the need of a more conservative central bank, in terms of the
relative weight attached to output stabilisation (i.e. ξ1 = λ1). This result
stresses the importance of constituting an independent central bank, which
is also one of the main prerequisites for successful monetary policy.
However, when corruption (φ < 1) is introduced, the government’s abil-
ity to raise revenues through the formal tax system is restricted and an
independent central bank can no longer achieve the SB, unless it becomes
less conservative towards output considerations than society (ξ1 =
λ1
φ > λ1).
Nonetheless, if, due to political or central bank credibility reasons, an in-
dependent central bank with ξ1 < λ1/φ has been legislatively constituted,
the government has the incentive to strategically accumulate debt in order
to increase second period inflation. Thus, despite the fact that the central
bank is free from fiscal dominance phenomena, the government can still af-
fect second period monetary policy, putting upward pressure on long-run
price stability, by increasing debt accumulation. This result is augmented
by the quality of institutions.24
Countries that are faced with low institutional quality (high corruption
indexes), as is the problem with many emerging market economies, even
if they constitute an independent central bank, which has been a general
trend in the past decade, could experience lower performances in terms of
controlling inflation compared to countries with high quality of institutions,
due to the higher incentive of the government to rely on borrowing. In other
words, our model suggests that a higher level of bureaucratic corruption
could be responsible for lower inflation performances and increasing debt
processes of economies that constitute an independent central bank.
This may provide one explanation for the divergent performance of emerg-
ing market economies that have introduced inflation-targeting regimes, though
it is too early to make decisive conclusions. Nonetheless, using a very simple
model, it has been demonstrated that corruption indexes can interact with
fiscal policy by shifting the financing of government spending towards in-
creased debts, which in turn interact with monetary policy and obstacle the
24This is the case under some conditions regarding the structural parameters of the
model. See footnote 23.
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efforts for price stabilisation and disinflation. This is in line with a number
of empirical studies (see Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) for a survey) claim-
ing that the negative relation between legal central bank independence and
average inflation is not uniformly observed in developing countries.
Thus, improving the quality of institutions is vital in order to avoid
sharp increases of debt after monetary policy reforms, and consequently
for the independent central bank to avoid budgetary pressures in achieving
its primary goal of price stability. Hence, an interesting future research
project is to connect the empirical evidence of lower inflation performance
of emerging market economies with the status of institutional quality and
the response of debt policy after monetary policy reforms.
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Appendix A: First Best
In a First Best World, distortions are removed and the centralised authority
is able to commit. Therefore, taxes are non-distortionary and there is no
corruption, that is φ = 1. However, we will allow φ to differ from unity and
show its effect on optimal monetary and fiscal setting.
Since taxes are non-distortionary the aggregate supply function becomes:
yt− yn = a(pit− pi
e
t ) and the government budget constraint: gt = pit+ φτt+
dt − (1 + ρ)dt−1, where τt = Tt/Y¯ represents lump-sum taxes as a share of
non-distortionary output. The problem is solved backwards.
• In the Second Period,
the centralised authority maximises




pi22 + λ1(y2 − yn)
2 + λ2(g2 − g
∗)2
]




g2 = pi2 + φτ2 − (1 + ρ)d1 i.e. d2 = 0




pi22 + λ2(pi2 + φτ2 − (1 + ρ)d1 − g
∗)2
]
The optimal monetary and fiscal instruments for the second period will




[(1 + ρ)d1 + g
∗] and pi2 = 0
If φ = 1, then taxes would be covering current government spending and
the debt burden of the first period. In a first best world, corruption is just
changing the intertemporal amount of taxes to be collected in each period.
Optimal inflation is zero. Consequently, u2 = 0, and second period welfare
is independent of d1.
• In the first period,
since u2 = 0 there is nothing connecting the two periods, and the government
similarly maximises,
maxτ1,pi1,d1 U











[(1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ − d1] and pi1 = 0
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And the FOCd1 holds for every d1,
λ2(pi1 + φτ1 + d1 − (1 + ρ)d0 − g
∗) = 0
d1 = (1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ − φτ1 ∀d1
since first period taxes are set according to τ1 =
1
φ
[(1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ − d1]. In
other words, one of the two fiscal instruments is redundant. Since taxes are
non-distortionary, taxes and debt and equivalent in both their use and effects
and hence interchangeable. For instance, if τ1 = 0, then all the first period
required revenues are raised through debt, d1 = (1 + ρ)d0 + g
∗ and second
period ones through second period taxes, τ2 =
(1+ρ)




Alternatively, if d1 = 0, then τ1 =
1
φ [(1 + ρ)d0 + g




In a first best world pit = 0, yt = yn, U
g = 0 and taxes and debt
are interchangeable. The level of corruption, φ, just increases the required
amount of tax revenues to be raised in each period.
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a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
(
β(1 + ρ)2
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
) [







a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
(
β(1 + ρ)2
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
)[






(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)) g
∗
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
τSB2 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
(
(1 + ρ)
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
) [







a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
(
(1 + ρ)
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
) [










a2λ1(1 + λ2) + φ2λ2
](
β(1 + ρ)2
1 + β(1 + ρ)2
) [






• With endogenous fiscal policy SB inflation is non-zero. Positive infla-
tion arises solely due to government spending considerations. Hence,
it reflects the benefits from seigniorage which arise not due to debt
constraints but due to distortionary taxation.
• SB debt policy in independent of φ. It is driven by the subjective time
preference of society (1/β) relative to the rate of returns on assets
(1 + ρ).
• Apart from debt, all other policy variables depend on φ. Quality of
institutions affects the SB outcome as follows. Lower quality gives rise
to a worse SB, with higher SB inflation levels, lower taxes and output
gap (if φ˜ > 1), lower government spending and lower social welfare.
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Appendix C: Delegation of Monetary Policy
Solution under a more conservative central bank
τdmc1 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
(
β(1 + ρ)2M
1 + β(1 + ρ)2M
) [








a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
(
β(1 + ρ)2M
1 + β(1 + ρ)2M
)[






(1 + ρ)d0 + (1− β(1 + ρ)M) g
∗








a2λ1λ2[a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)]
τdmc2 =
φλ2
a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
(
(1 + ρ)
1 + β(1 + ρ)2M
) [








a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)
(
(1 + ρ)
1 + β(1 + ρ)2M
) [














[a2λ1(1 + ξ2) + φλ2(φ+ a2ξ1)]2
]
(
β(1 + ρ)2(1 + β(1 + ρ)2M2)
[1 + β(1 + ρ)2M ]2
) [





The solution outcome presented in the Table above nests three special cases.
1. With ξi = λi, i = 1, 2 it reduces to the outcome obtained under
discretionary centralised policies (Section 2.1). In this case M = K >
1 ∀φ.
• Since monetary policy is inconsistent, intratemporal distortions
arise.
τd < τSB, pid > piSB, gd > gSB, Ud < USB ∀φ in both periods
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• dd1 is no longer independent of φ. Debt policy is partially driven
by intratemporal considerations (K) in an attempt to correct for
them. Hence, dd1 > d
SB
1 .
• Regarding the effect of the quality of institutions on the discre-
tionary outcome, under some conditions lower quality results in
increased debt and in less intratemporal distortions. See D.2.
2. With ξi ≤ λi, i = 1, 2 it reduces to the case where monetary policy
has been delegated to a more conservative central bank.
• Debt policy is still depending on φ (and the relative weights of
both policymakers)
• Whether the economy accumulates more or less debt compared
to the SB will depend on the degree of central bank conservatism
(relative to government’s preferences) and the level of corruption.
• The delegated parameters that maximise government’s utility, are
given by




The optimal delegated parameters correct for both intratemporal
and intertemporal distortions and attain the SB.
• Both delegated parameters are inversely related to the quality
of institutions. Lower quality requires less conservative central
banks for the SB to be obtained.
3. With ξ2 = 0 (and ξ1 6= λ1) it reduces to the outcome under an inde-
pendent central bank and M|ξ2=0 = N .
• If ξ1 = λ1/φ > λ1 the SB is again restored.
• However, if ξ1 ≤ λ1/φ, then N < 1 and both intratemporal and
intertemporal distortions arise. The independent central bank is
overconservative and hence overcorrecting for inflation in both
periods. Hence,
piICB < piSB, τ ICB > τSB, U ICB < USB ∀φ in both periods
• Debt depends on φ and the government accumulates debt in an
attempt to correct the intratemporal imbalances. Thus, dICB1 >
dSB1 . Upward pressure on second period inflation is placed and the
price stability the independent central bank is trying to establish
is obstacled at the cost of more debt.
• Under some conditions, lower quality results in higher intratem-
poral distortions and higher debt accumulation. See D.3.
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Appendix D
Suppose we have two economies in which their only difference lies on the
level of institutional quality. The structural parameters are set according
to:
λ1 = 1.2 λ2 = 1.7
η = 0.6 a = 1.5
φH = 0.95 φL = 0.60
D.1







Hence, more corruption (lower φ) is always resulting in a shift away from SB
tax for both periods, as presented in Section 2 (page 9). Therefore, lower
quality of institutions translates into a SB solution with higher inflation,
lower taxes, output gap, government spending and overall social welfare.
D.2
In the discretionary outcome under a centralised authority (Section 2.1) if
a2λ1 > φ, then
∂dd1
∂φ < 0. The chosen parameters assure that a
2λ1 > 1, hence
lower institutional quality results in higher debt. This is to say that, though
discretionary debt setting is always below the SB level of debt, the lower





To assess the magnitude of the intratemporal distortions under different
levels of institutional quality we need to identify the effect of φ on the













In our example, a
2λ1(1+λ2)
λ2
> 1, hence it always holds that intratemporal
distortions are higher for higher levels of institutional quality. This is one
reason why economies will higher levels of quality are using debt to restrict
themselves even more.
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D.3
Regarding the central bank independence regime, the chosen parameters







for both levels of corruption.




for the two chosen levels of corruption, since they are both greater than 1/2.
How are the intratemporal distortions affected by φ is this case? Sim-
ilarly to D.2 one should analyse the effect of φ on the difference between










∂|τ ICB − τSB|
∂φ
< 0
The chosen parameter values satisfy a
2λ1
λ2
> 1. So, it is the lower quality
economy that ends up with more intratemporal distortions. Hence, the need
to increase debt in order to correct for them is higher.
Comparing the minimum value of the central bank’s conservatism, ξ∗1 ,
that shifts the effect of ξ1 on N(ξ1) from positive to negative, for lower
quality of institutions, ξ∗1 corresponds to a higher value of ξ1 and a lower
value of N . That is, for greater corruption levels, the range of ξ1 (0, ξ
∗
1) that
is restraining the government from using the debt channel to affect second
period monetary policy is larger. The reasoning behind this outcome is
that with higher corruption levels the tax system is very inefficient and the
reliance on seigniorage revenues is greater. Consequently, for the government
to use the debt mechanism, ξ1 must also be greater for the central bank’s





φH = 0.95 0.5169 0.8185 1.6803 1.1950
φL = 0.6 0.7860 0.7860 2.3530 1.1094
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Also note that for severe (and somehow not very plausible) levels of
corruption (φ < 0.5) it could be the case that ξ1 = λ1 lies on the negatively
sloped part of N(ξ1). In our example this happens for φ < 0.4, in which
cases ξ∗1 > ξ1 = λ1 = 1.2.
Recalling from Section 5.2 (page 25) there is scope for the unpleasant
monetarist arithmetics to take place for high values of ξ1 (ξ1 > ξ˜1). Nonethe-
less, in our example there is no need to worry about this phenomenon be-
cause in both cases of high and low quality of institutions, the value of ξ1
after which a more conservative central bank results in higher inflation lies
above the SB value25, i.e. ξ˜1 > ξ
SB
1 = λ1/φ.
25Actually, given the chosen parameters, for any 0 < φ < 1, ξ˜1 > ξ
SB
1 . However, this is
not a general result. For the unpleasant monetarist arithmetics to emerge before the SB,
λ2 (λ1) should be large (small), relative to each other and the level of corruption.
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